








None: All rights reserved
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Connolly, R 2016, 'The empire strikes back: Western economic statecraft and the securitisation of political
economy in Russia', Europe-Asia Studies, pp. 35-67. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2016.1156056
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
Publisher Rights Statement:




Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Mar. 2020
Dr. Richard Connolly 




The Empire Strikes Back: Economic Statecraft and the Securitisation of Political 




Economic statecraft has been the primary tool used by Western powers and their allies 
in response to Russian involvement in the conflict in Ukraine. The term economic 
statecraft refers to a range of measures, including travel bans on individuals, asset 
freezes, trade embargoes, financial restrictions and other economic sanctions.2 The 
objective of economic statecraft is not always clear; while effecting a change in the 
target country’s foreign policy behavior is desirable and the ostensible objective of 
statecraft, in reality policy makers from sender countries often realise that the aims of 
statecraft should be more limited.3 Imposing a cost on the target country to signal 
displeasure with its policies, for example, is a more limited objective. Imposing such 
a cost might then deter the target country from escalating its objectionable (in the eyes 
of the sender countries) behaviour.  
 
1 The author would like to thank Julian Cooper, Philip Hanson and Silvana Malle for 
comments made on previous iterations of this article. In addition, the insightful 
comments provided by two anonymous reviewers are gratefully acknowledged. Lucy 
Buckland also provided helpful research assistance. The usual disclaimers apply.   
2 For a broad discussion of economic statecraft, see Baldwin 1985; and for a discussion of the West’s 
use of economic statecraft in relation to the Soviet Union during the Cold War, see Hanson 1988.  
3 The terminology of the statecraft literature refers to the country or countries imposing economic 
measures as ‘sender’ countries, while the country (or countries) that is the object of statecraft is 
described as the ‘target’ country.   
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In the context of the Ukraine conflict, the stated aims of Western economic statecraft 
are multiple. For example, certain measures were imposed in response to Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea in March 2014. Later, wider ranging measures (so-called 
sectoral sanctions) were imposed because of Russia’s involvement in the conflict in 
south-eastern Ukraine. What is common to all these measures is a desire by the 
Western sender countries to impose a cost on the actions of the target country, Russia. 
These costs may then, at the very least, send a clear signal that Western countries are 
unhappy with Russia’s actions in Ukraine, or possibly even deter Russia from 
escalating its activities. It is also possible, at least in theory, that if the costs of 
economic statecraft to Russia are sufficiently high, it might be persuaded to modify or 
reverse its policies towards Ukraine.   
 
The focus of this article is on assessing the costs imposed by Western economic 
statecraft on the Russian economy. The purpose of the article is not to determine 
whether economic statecraft has achieved its political objectives – whether they are 
signalling deterrence or a demand for modification of Russia’s foreign policy. While 
the economic impact and the effectiveness of economic statecraft are treated as 
analytically distinct, it is nevertheless true in practice that the magnitude of the costs 
imposed by economic statecraft is an important component in determining whether it 
will be effective as an instrument of foreign policy. After all, if the costs for the target 
country are modest, it is possible that the effectiveness of economic statecraft might 
be correspondingly low. In addition to assessing the costs of economic statecraft, this 
article will also consider the Russian policy response and the impact that this response 
has exerted upon domestic political economy in Russia.   
 
To address these two questions, the article is organised as follows. The first section 
provides an assessment of the impact of Western economic statecraft on the 
performance of the Russian economy between March 2014 and spring 2015. This is 
done by first examining the importance of other conjunctural factors that also shaped 
the performance of the Russian economy during the period under examination, and 
then considering the direct and indirect effects of sanctions. It is argued that while 
some aspects of Western statecraft clearly imposed a significant cost to Russia -- 
especially sanctions directed at the financial sector – the impact of the falling price of 
oil and the pre-existing slowdown in the economy complicate any attempt at 
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explaining the sources of Russia’s poor economic performance. Assessing the precise 
impact of economic statecraft is therefore extremely difficult. The second section 
considers the impact that Western statecraft has exerted on domestic political 
economy in Russia. Here, it is argued that the Russian domestic policy response to the 
use of economic statecraft has thus far been consistent with the behaviour of many 
other countries that have been targeted by similar measures in the past. Perhaps the 
most important observation is that the system of political economy is becoming 
increasingly securitised, in other words defined by national security concerns rather 
than the demands of economic development. A third and final section concludes the 
argument.    
 
The Impact of Economic Statecraft on Russian Economic Performance 
 
There are a range of estimates of the economic impact of Western statecraft imposed 
in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and military involvement in 
Ukraine. In November 2014, the Finance Minister, Anton Siluanov, suggested that 
sanctions had cost Russia $40bn.4 In April 2015, President Putin stated that sanctions 
have cost Russia $160 billion (Latukhina 2015). Outside Russia, numerous politicians 
have assigned great importance to the impact of sanctions on the functioning and 
performance of the Russian economy during what turned out to be a very turbulent 
period.5  
 
4 ‘Anton Siluanov: iz-za sanktsii v 2014 godu Rossiya poteryayet $40 mlrd, iz-za padeniya tsen na neft' 
— okolo $100 mlrd’ [Anton Siluanov: Russia will lose $40bn in 2014 because of sanctions and around 
$100bn because of the falling price of oil], Kommersant.ru, 24 November 2014, available at: 
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2617993, accessed 20 August 2015.  
5 David Cameron stated in November 2014 that sanctions were behind the poor economic performance 
of Russia at that time (Wintour 2014). US President, Barack Obama, went even further, claiming that 
sanctions had left the Russian economy “in tatters”. See ‘Obama Says Western Sanctions Have Left 
Russia's Economy “In Tatters”’, The Moscow Times, 21 January 2015, available at: 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/obama-says-western-sanctions-have-left-russia-s-
economy-in-tatters/514671.html, accessed 20 August 2015.  
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However, estimating the impact of economic sanctions on the Russian economy since 
March 2014 is fraught with even more difficulty than is normal when carrying out 
such estimates. In addition to the methodological challenges inherent to any such 
exercise under even ‘normal’ conditions, the performance of the Russian economy in 
the year subsequent to the imposition of sanctions was also affected by additional 
conjunctural, and therefore complicating, factors.  
 
First, Russia was already in the grip of an economic slowdown that saw the country 
drift towards stagnation even before the imposition of sanctions. This slowdown was 
structural in nature and has been exerting a negative effect on a number of key 
economic indicators. Second, the dramatic decline in oil prices over the second half of 
2014 was of profound importance to an economy that was, in 2013, the world’s 
second largest producer and exporter of oil, and that relies on receipts from oil exports 
to provide around half of Federal government revenue. 6  
 
Consequently, disentangling the impact of statecraft from the other two, arguably 
more important, forces buffeting the Russian economy is near impossible. Healthy 
scepticism should therefore be exercised when presented with suspiciously precise 
estimates of the economic impact of Western statecraft. Rather than seeking to 
identify a precise cost to the Russian economy (in dollar terms, for example), it is 
perhaps more useful to examine how economic statecraft may have affected the 
economy in a step-wise fashion, assessing first the ‘direct’ impact on the targeted 
sectors of the economy, and then the less obvious ‘indirect’ impact that statecraft may 
have exerted on the functioning of the wider economy. Before doing so, however, it is 
first necessary to sketch out the importance of the economic context in which 
statecraft was imposed.  
 
Context matters: slowing economic growth and the collapse in the price of oil 
 
A truly accurate assessment of the macroeconomic impact of statecraft would require 
that the ceteris paribus condition be satisfied. However, in 2014-2015, all other things 
6 BP (2014). In 2013, Russia produced an average of 10.3 million barrels per day (bpd). This compared 
to 11.5 million bpd in Saudi Arabia and 10 million in the USA.  
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in the Russian economy were far from equal. It is important to be aware of two highly 
significant factors that influenced the performance of the Russian economy at the time 
that sanctions were imposed.  
 
<Insert Figure 1>  
 
First, Russia’s economic performance had been weakening for several years. This is 
likely due to the exhaustion of the economic growth model that served Russia well 
between 1999 and 2008.7 As illustrated in Figure 1, annual real GDP growth was 
estimated to have slowed to just 0.6% in 2014, down from around 4% in 2012 and 
considerably slower than the 1999–2007 average of over 7%. This slowdown was 
likely caused by a combination of many factors, among which the most important 
were a shrinking labour force, the slowdown in government and consumer spending 
and, perhaps most importantly, a low share of investment in economic activity (see 
Connolly 2011; Gaddy and Ickes 2014). 
 
The second factor to note is the sharp decline in the price of oil which began in the 
second half of 2014 and continued into 2015. The average price for Urals crude oil 
hovered around $110 per barrel from 2011 to June 2014. Prices then plummeted to 
$47 per barrel at the end of January 2015. This resulted in a sharp decline in export 
revenues and tax receipts despite the fact that the volume of oil production in Russia 
reached a post-Soviet record level in 2014. Although oil prices later recovered 
somewhat in the first half of 2015 – Urals crude was trading at around $65 per barrel 
in mid-May 2015 – they fell again to below $40 per barrel in December 2015.  
 
<Insert Table 1> 
 
7 Essentially, this model was based on the redistribution of fast-growing natural resource revenues to 
other parts of the economy. See Kudrin and Gurvich 2014; Zamaraev, Kiiutsevskaia, Nazarova and 
Sukhanov 2013; Mau 2014; Mau 2013; Connolly 2015; World Bank 2015. On the wider regional 
slowdown, see Prochniak 2011. 
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The simultaneous structural slowdown in economic growth in Russia and the decline 
in the price of oil make it difficult to isolate the economic impact of sanctions. To 
illustrate this point consider first the influence of the structural slowdown on 
economic performance. A large number of economic forecasts made immediately 
before the imposition of the first round of sanctions in late March 2014, or just after, 
predicted that annual GDP growth in 2014 would be very low (Table 1). Yet the 
economy defied the expectations of the majority of forecasters and grew by an 
estimated 0.6% on an annual basis. All of these forecasts were unanimous in citing 
domestic factors, such as weak investment, as the primary drivers of weak 
performance. They did not take sanctions into account. If these forecasts had been 
made with the knowledge that a range of significant economic sanctions would be 
imposed, or indeed that the price of oil would fall by around 50%, it is likely that the 
forecasts would have been even more pessimistic.  
 
The Russian economy certainly did not perform well in 2014. But nor did it perform 
any worse than it was expected to, and, if anything, slightly surpassed pre-sanctions 
expectations.8 This does not necessarily mean that the imposition of sanctions acted 
as a boost to the Russian economy (or to put it differently, that sanctions were a net 
benefit to the economy). Rather, what it does suggest is: (a) that the initial negative 
economic impact of sanctions may have been modest; and (b) that some other factor 
that forecasters had not predicted may explain why the Russian economy performed 
slightly better than it was expected to.   
 
It is likely that the other factor explaining Russia’s economic performance was related 
to the sharp depreciation of the ruble that occurred over the course of 2014. Some 
commentators have suggested that this depreciation was caused at least partially by 
sanctions. It is, for example, intuitively appealing to suggest that sanctions may have 
led to a loss of business confidence in Russia, which in turn caused a rise in capital 
outflows, generating downward pressure on the exchange rate. However, closer 
inspection of the data reveals that daily movements in the price of oil act as a more 
reliable predictor of ruble-dollar exchange rate movements: between January 2013 
8 It should be noted that any conclusions derived from comparing actual performance with forecasts 
should be treated with caution. After all, the economic forecasts may not have been accurate in the first 
place.  
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and May 2015, the correlation in movements between the two was almost perfect 
(Figure 2). 9   
 
<Insert Figure 2> 
 
Thus, the single best explanation for the deprecation of the ruble was the decline in oil 
prices. Most analysts did not expect the sudden and sharp decline in oil prices, and if 
it had been anticipated, they would probably have predicted dire consequences for the 
Russian economy. However, the impact on the Russian economy was mixed. On the 
one hand, the value of total exports, dominated by hydrocarbon sales, plummeted with 
a corresponding depreciation of the ruble. On the other hand, ruble depreciation 
helped cushion federal tax revenues from the fall in the price of oil. Russia’s dollar-
denominated oil revenues – which historically account for around half of total federal 
income – bought more rubles than they did in 2013. Consequently, Russia actually 
registered a modest federal budget surplus in 2014 (Ministry of Finance of the 
Russian Federation 2014).  
 
Depreciation also raised the price of imported goods and services, resulting in a sharp 
decline in the value of imports. However, the weak currency also appeared to have 
boosted domestic production of goods and services through the import substitution 
effect. In simple terms, as the price of imported goods rose, Russian consumers and 
businesses switched to homemade substitutes. As is illustrated below, the impact of 
the weak ruble may well have cushioned the Russian economy from both the home-
grown slowdown and the imposition of sanctions.     
 
To sum up so far: the simultaneous nature of the shocks affecting economic 
performance in Russia over the course of 2014-2015 was highly significant from an 
analytical point of view. No single factor from the structural slowdown - the fall in oil 
prices or the imposition of sanctions -, can solely explain economic performance over 
this period. Moreover, the interaction between each factor has resulted in some 
unexpected outcomes (such as the growth in GDP that exceeded most forecasts). It is 
therefore difficult to assign with any confidence a specific weight to the importance of 
9 The Pearsons’ r correlation coefficient is 0.96.  
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Western economic statecraft on Russian economic performance during the period 
under examination.  
 
Direct effects of Western statecraft on economic performance in Russia10 
 
If the overall macroeconomic impact of economic statecraft is difficult to discern, it is 
nevertheless plausible to argue that it may have affected the performance of targeted 
sectors. In addition to asset freezes and visa bans on Russian individuals, companies 
or other entities in Russia/Ukraine who are considered to be complicit in Russia’s 
actions in Ukraine, sanctions were targeted at three main sectors – energy, defence 
and finance. They included:  
• a ban on trading bonds and equity and related brokering services for products 
whose maturity period exceeds 30 days with some of Russia’s largest state-
controlled banks (including Sberbank and Gazprombank), three Russian 
energy companies (including Rosneft’, Transneft’, and Gazprom Neft’; 
although Gazprom was excluded from EU sanctions, it was subject to US 
sanctions), and numerous Russian defence companies (including United 
Aircraft Corporation, Uralvagonzavod and Almaz-Antei); 
• restrictions on loans to five major Russian state-owned banks by EU countries: 
Sberbank; VTB; Gazprombank; Vneshekonombank (VEB); and 
Rosselkhozbank; with the US ban also including Bank of Moscow; 
• an embargo on arms trade with Russia;   
• a ban on exports of so-called dual-use items, i.e. civilian industrial goods that 
can be used as (or to produce) weapons systems; and 
• a ban on the provision, exportation, or re-exportation of goods, services (not 
including financial services), or technology in support of exploration or 
exploitation of deepwater, Arctic offshore, or tight oil projects.  
 
In response, Russia imposed countersanctions in August 2014, which resulted in a 
one-year ban on imports of fruit, vegetables, meat, fish, milk and dairy from a number 
of countries, including the EU, Japan and the USA. The initial impact of sanctions in 
each of these four sectors is discussed below.  
10 Passages from this section borrow heavily from Connolly (2015b).  
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 The defence industry 
 
Defence industry production rose in 2014-2015, despite sanctions, due to growing 
demand from abroad (with India the largest foreign customer) and from a surge in 
domestic orders that was explained by the rise in armaments procurement. The arms 
embargo did affect some companies and high-profile projects within both Russia and 
the West. For example, France and Italy both had multi-billion dollar deals to supply 
Russian customers which were compromised by the imposition of sanctions. All 
future deals - and in the case of the French Mistral helicopter carrier, some past deals 
- were affected by the embargo. The aggregate effect of the arms embargo on Russia 
was, however, modest due to the fact that only a small proportion of Western arms 
exports go to Russia, and a correspondingly small proportion of Russian arms exports 
go to Western countries. As a result, despite the imposition of sanctions, Russia 
recorded well over $13 billion worth of arms exports in 2014 (Figure 3), making 
Russia the world’s second largest exporter of armaments.11  
 
<Insert Figure 3> 
 
This robust export performance was achieved while domestic orders also rose to post-
Soviet high levels. As part of the state armaments programme (gosudarstvennaya 
programma vooruzheniya, or GPV) to 2020, which aims to reequip and modernise 
Russia’s armed forces, military spending as measured by SIPRI rose from 3.2% of 
GDP in 2000, to 4.5% in 2014.12 Of this, half was spent on procurement and research 
and development (R&D). In 2015, military expenditure was expected to peak at 5.4%, 
11 The $13bn figure is as reported by the assistant to the Russian president, Vladimir Kozhin. See 
‘Rossiiskii oboronnyi eksport otsenili v 13 milliardov dollarov’ [Russians arms exports valued at $13 
billion], 17 December 2014, available at: http://lenta.ru/news/2014/12/17/exports/, accessed 20 August 
2015. The figure by Kozhin is expressed in current prices unlike data from the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 
12 All data on volume and composition of military expenditure are derived from Cooper 2015 (cited 
with permission of the author).  
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with 60.5% of this amount earmarked for procurement and R&D. Given the strength 
of external and domestic demand, there was little scope for further expansion of 
export deliveries due to domestic orders stretching the capacity of the Russian arms 
industry (oboronnyi-promyshlennyi kompleks, or OPK) to fulfil all the orders placed.   
 
The OPK did, however, encounter some problems in implementing production orders 
because of the Ukraine crisis. Some of these problems emerged not only as a result of 
Western sanctions, but also because of severed links with Ukrainian defence industry 
enterprises that were previously closely integrated with the Russian defence-industrial 
production network. The Ukrainian ban on arms exports to Russia has, for example, 
caused shortages of helicopter engines and power supply units for naval ships. The 
impact of Western sanctions was observed in the form of reduced access to some 
individual components used within weapons systems rather than in final weapon 
systems. To address these weaknesses, the Russian defence industry and Military-
Industrial Commission developed an import substitution plan to replace embargoed 
products with domestically-produced items. According to the deputy defence minister 
for armaments, Yurii Borisov, this import substitution plan for Ukrainian products 
should be fully implemented by 2017, although replacing Western components may 
take longer (see Naberezhnov 2014 and Mukhin 2015). 
 
The hydrocarbons sector 
 
The impact of sanctions on oil production over 2014-2015 was negligible, with post-
Soviet record levels of oil production registered in 2014 (Figure 4).13 This is because 
Western sanctions target projects oriented to future rather than current production. 
This has been done by the imposition of restrictions on technologies related to Arctic 
13 ‘Eksport rossiiskoi nefti za 4 mesyatsa 2015 goda vyros na 5,8% - do 79,49 mln tonn’ [Exports of 
Russian oil for the first four months of 2015 increased by 5.8% to 79.49 million tonnes], Oil and Gas 
Information Agency,  6 May 2015, available at: http://www.angi.ru/news.shtml?oid=2824669, 
accessed 20 August 2015; and ‘Sanktsii okazalis' bessil'ny protiv energeticheskogo sektora Rossii’ 
[Sanctions were powerless against Russia’s energy sector], Oil and Gas Information Agency, 6 May 
2015, available at: http://www.angi.ru/news.shtml?oid=2824627, accessed 20 August 2015.  
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and deep-water exploration, as well as onshore tight oil extraction (for example, from 
the giant Bazhenov formation). The vast majority of Russia’s current oil production 
comes from onshore deposits in Western and Eastern Siberia, both of which continued 
to yield large volumes of hydrocarbons (IEA, 2014, p. 147). However, as illustrated in 
Figure 4, production from existing ‘brownfield’ deposits is expected to decline over 
the next decade. Unless massive investment in ‘greenfield’ deposits is undertaken -- 
especially in the offshore deep-water, Arctic and tight oil deposits targeted by 
sanctions -- declining production may not be replaced. As a result, sanctions should 
only be expected to affect Russian oil production over the medium term (i.e. 3-5 
years).  
 
<Insert Figure 4> 
 
While aggregate production remained unaffected by sanctions, a number of high 
profile joint projects with Western international oil companies (IOCs), such as Exxon-
Mobil and Statoil, were disrupted.14 Perhaps the most high profile example is the joint 
venture between Rosneft’ and Exxon’s Kars Project to extract oil from the Kara 
Sea. 15 Without Western IOC participation, Russian firms lacked the technological 
capability to exploit this or other similar deposits. While these projects are high 
profile, the short-term impact should not be exaggerated. For example, a 
spokesperson for the French IOC, Total, stated in May 2015 that sanctions prevented 
it from proceeding with only one project from its activities in Russia.16   
14 A number of such joint ventures were formed in 2010-2011 to help Russian state-owned firms 
exploit technologically demanding and hard-to-reach deposits offshore and in the Arctic. See Overland, 
Godzimirski, Lunden and Fjaertoft 2013. 
15 ‘"Rosneft'" v sluchaye okonchatel'nogo vykhoda Exxon iz proyekta Karskogo morya ne budet iskat' 
partnera – Sechin’ [‘In the case of a definitive Exxon exit from the Kara Sea project, Rosneft will not 
look for a partner’- Sechin], 30 October 2014, available at: 
http://www.oilcapital.ru/company/255623.html, accessed 20 August 2015.  
16 ‘Investitsii Total v RF ne byli zamorozheny, kompaniya prodolzhayet proyekty v strane’ 
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 As in the armaments industry, the Russian authorities developed a range of counter 
measures to prevent Western sanctions from constraining exploitation of 
technologically-demanding deposits. These included efforts to include equipment 
used for hydrocarbons extraction in the wider import substitution strategy, as well as 
to source such equipment from countries not involved in the sanctions regime, such as 
China (Barkov 2015). Elsewhere, Gazprom resorted to employing larger numbers of 
contractors to build smaller portions of the Power of Siberia pipeline in order to 
circumvent the constraints imposed by sanctions on the ability of Gazprom and 
several construction companies to acquire capital and technology (Sirov 2015). 
 
While there was much uncertainty as to whether Russia could produce substitutes to a 
sufficiently high standard, early signs indicated that efforts to switch suppliers of 
imported equipment were bearing fruit. Trade data reveal that in 2014 imports of 
equipment used in oil and gas extraction (drilling and tunneling equipment, pumps, 
etc.) from Western countries involved in the sanctions regime fell by around 50%.17 
By contrast, imports of similar equipment from China rose by 8%. This is even more 
noteworthy considering that total imports of such equipment fell by 24%, as the 
decline in oil prices caused oil producers to rein in investment (Yedovina 2015).          
 
It is also worth noting that many consider the single biggest obstacle to future oil 
production in Russia to be the onerous tax regime currently in place. This is a claim 
made frequently by those in Russia’s energy industry, including even by the minister 
for natural resources, Sergei Donskoi, who recently asserted that Russia’s ‘imperfect’ 
taxation of the hydrocarbons sector is a bigger problem for the industry than Western 
 [Total has not frozen its investments in Russia, the company is continuing its projects in the country], 
Oil and Gas Information Agency, 20 May 2015, available at: 
http://www.angi.ru/news.shtml?oid=2825111, accessed 20 August 2015.  
17 ‘International Trade in Goods – Exports 2001-2014’, International Trade Centre, available at: 
http://www.intracen.org/itc/market-info-tools/statistics-export-product-country/, accessed 20 August 
2015.  
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economic sanctions. 18  It is thus possible, at least in principle, for Russian oil 
production to be maintained via changes to the taxation and regulatory system if it 
proves difficult to acquire substitutes for Western technology. 19   
 
In addition to restrictions on acquiring equipment, many Russian energy producers 
have been blocked from accessing capital. This is important for two reasons. First, 
and as stated previously, continued production requires massive volumes of capital 
investment (Henderson 2015). Financial sanctions have created a clear mismatch 
between projected investment and availability of capital to fund it. Second, many 
Russian energy producers – not least the state-owned Rosneft’ and Gazprom – are 
highly leveraged, with high debt-revenue ratios, much of which is denominated in 
foreign currencies. Constrained in their ability to refinance existing stocks of debt, 
targeted Russian energy companies simply carried out scheduled repayments. Despite 
the decline in oil prices, foreign currency-denominated revenues, as well as existing 
cash assets, were used to finance these repayments. Some firms, such as Rosneft’, 
also tapped into public foreign currency reserves (such as those managed by the 
Central Bank). Perhaps in a sign of financial distress, Rosneft was rumoured to be 
considering opening credit lines with state-owned banks, as well as applying for 
access to the country’s sovereign wealth fund (NWF) (Mordyushenko and Melnikov 
2015). It has also been suggested that Rosneft’ may sell a 19.7% share in the company 
to raise capital (Antonova 2015). Inevitably, high debt servicing costs have reduced 
the availability of capital to finance investment, although the low price of oil caused a 
retrenchment in capital investment across the global energy industry, and not just in 
Russia.  
 
18 See ‘Sanctions against Russia already affecting production of tight reserves, could impact shelf’, 
Interfaks, 10 September 2014, available at http://www.interfax.com/newsinf.asp?id=535345, accessed 
20 August 2015. See also Barsukov 2014. 
19 Several institutional changes have taken place, see ‘"Gazprom" obsuzhdayet s LUKOYLom 
vozmozhnost' raboty na uchastkakh shel'fa’ [Gazprom and Lukoil discuss the possibility of working on 
shelf sites], RIA Novosti, 19 May 2015, available at: 
http://ria.ru/economy/20150519/1065301711.html#ixzz3aa6Lh33c, accessed 20 August 2015.  
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In the event that the existing sanctions regime is maintained, the key issue is whether 
Russia can successfully replace existing Western technology and finance, either 
domestically (through import substitution or the use of state financial resources) or 
from ‘friendly’ states (in the form of equipment or loans). In this respect, much will 
depend on Russian government economic policy. At the time of writing, it appears 
that the Russian government would proceed with import substitution plans 
irrespective of whether the sanctions regime is relaxed. This is because Russia’s 
leaders appeared to have come to the conclusion that Russia should insulate itself 
from the threat of further sanctions in the future. Not to do so would represent a threat 
to Russia’s national security, as stated after a meeting by the Russian National 
Security Council (Egorov 2015).20  
 
The financial sector 
 
Financial sanctions exerted perhaps the most observable influence over the Russian 
economy. Access to Western capital markets was effectively closed to a large number 
of Russian corporations, and not just those directly targeted by sanctions. Firms in 
sectors directly targeted by sanctions – such as those in the energy, defence and 
construction industries – suffered. But so did firms not directly sanctioned, due to a 
‘contagion’ effect as lenders became reluctant to lend to Russian firms because of 
fears that sanctions may be extended in the future.   
 
<Insert Figure 5> 
 
This resulted in many Russian firms being forced to repay, rather than refinance, their 
external debt obligations, causing a significant rise in net private capital outflows and 
a reduction in the pool of capital available to fund investment in the wider economy 
(Figure 5). Indeed, the size of capital outflows in 2014 was more severe than the 
‘sudden stop’ of capital inflows that accompanied the recession of 2008-09. Total 
non-financial corporate (which includes many large state enterprises, such as Rosneft’ 
and Gazprom) and financial sector external debt fell from around $715 billion in 
20 ‘Kto upravlyaet khaosom’, Rossiiskaya gazeta,10 February 2015, available at 
http://www.rg.ru/2015/02/11/patrushev.html, accessed 20 August 2015.  
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January 2014 to $597 billion at the end of 2014. The total stock of external debt has 
declined due to a combination of repayments (to Western banks), rescheduling of 
existing debt (to banks or other corporate entities that either own or are linked with 
the Russian debtors), or because of a reduction in the dollar value of ruble-
denominated debt.  
 
<Insert Figure 6> 
 
The surge in private capital outflows, at least partially driven by external debt 
repayments, contributed to the reduction in Russia’s foreign exchange reserves (see 
Figure 6). It has been suggested that this threatened the financial stability of Russia 
because Russia’s international reserves were not liquid enough to be used to meet 
external financial obligations, and also because Russia’s foreign debt obligations in 
2015 and 2016 exceeded the stock of reserves (Åslund 2014). However, upon closer 
examination, Russia’s financial position appeared to be reasonably stable.    
 
First, Russian reserves, including gold, which is normally held by central banks to 
provide emergency liquidity assistance should foreign assets suddenly depreciate, 
and reserves assigned to the two sovereign wealth funds – the Reserve Fund and the 
National Wealth Fund – could be utilised by the authorities, if required. Indeed, it 
should be noted that the domestic spending obligations attached to the Reserve Fund 
and the National Wealth Fund are denominated in rubles. Consequently, domestic 
obligations could be met by simply instructing the Central Bank to print rubles to 
‘purchase’ their holdings of foreign exchange reserves. 
 
Second, Russia’s external debt obligations were (and continue to be) exaggerated by 
financial arrangements employed by Russian corporate groups, which resulted in a 
substantial volume of ‘intra-group’ debt. These debts to ‘parent’ companies by 
subsidiaries were much softer loans than those taken out from Western banks. Indeed, 
many corporate groups postponed payments on such debt over 2014-2015. These 
intra-group debts accounted for nearly a quarter of Russia’s total stock of external 
debt (i.e., around $133 billion at the end of 2014). Moreover, intra-group debt 
repayments accounted for a proportionately larger share of scheduled external debt 
payments over 2015 (55% of all scheduled repayments) and 2016 (42%). In addition, 
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Russian corporations also held significant cash reserves abroad (well over $100 
billion in mid-2015).21    
 
Third, as a country that consistently runs a large surplus on the current account of its 
balance of payments, Russia was in a position to be able to generate annual flows of 
dollar income in the region of at least 2-3% of GDP.  
 
Thus, while it is clear that Russia was stretched by financial sanctions and saw the 
availability of capital dwindle, it possessed sufficient reserves, as well as the capacity 
to generate future earnings of foreign exchange, to ensure financial stability, at least 
in the short-term. The ostensibly large external debt liability was also exaggerated by 
intra-group financing arrangements. As a result, Russia probably passed the peak of 
external financing pressure in late 2014. Because increased access to capital from 
alternative sources (such as Asian capital markets) had not materialised, sanctioned 
Russian firms began to reorganise their finance arrangements over 2014-2015 so that 




The effects of Russian counter sanctions in the agricultural sector can be examined on 
the producer side (i.e. on Russian agricultural producers) and the consumer side (i.e. 
on the price and availability of food products to Russian consumers). Domestic 
producers of agricultural goods are seemingly well placed to benefit from the 
limitations imposed on Western producers. However, Russian producers tend to be 
weakest in those sectors where Western producers were most active, such as pork and 
beef products as well as specific categories of fruit and vegetables. As a result, 
domestic production did not rise as dramatically as some initially hoped. In 2014, 
21 ‘External Sector Statistics’, Central Bank of the Russian Federation, available at: 
http://www.cbr.ru/Eng/statistics/?PrtId=svs, accessed 20 August 2015.  
22 ‘External Sector Statistics’, accessed 20 August 2015.   
 16 
                                                        
agricultural production grew by 3.7%.23 Thus, domestic production has expanded, but 
only modestly. Instead, trade data reveal that substitutes for European products have 
been found in third countries, such as Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Chile, China and 
Turkey.24 
 
The reduction in imports from Western countries, and the costs associated with 
seeking new suppliers, resulted in food prices rising above the average rate of 
consumer price inflation (CPI). Again, it is difficult to separate the impact of the food 
embargo from the ruble depreciation that contributed to a wider rise in prices for all 
imported products (Figure 7). Food price inflation tended to affect those segments of 
society that consumed imported goods, that is, mainly the urban, middle classes. 
Poorer sections of Russian society were less affected for the simple reason that they 
tended to buy more domestically-produced products, although the price of 
domestically-produced food products also rose. It is also worth noting that historically 
it is not unusual for food prices to diverge from the headline rate of inflation in 
Russia.  
 




Sanctions may also have affected economic performance through indirect channels. 
For example, sanctions may have caused a diversion in the trade of certain goods or 
services, even if those goods or services were not explicitly sanctioned. For example, 
if there are expectations of future sanctions from certain countries, Russian firms may 
have sought to insulate themselves from any potential future disruptions by seeking 
23 ‘Produktsiya sel'skogo khozyaistva po kategoriyam khozyaystv’ [Agricultural Production by Type of 
Farm], Federal State Statistics Service, available at: 
http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/business/sx/tab-sel1.htm, accessed 20 August 2015.  
24 ‘International Trade in Goods – Exports 2001-2014’, International Trade Centre, available at: 
http://www.intracen.org/itc/market-info-tools/statistics-export-product-country/, accessed 20 August 
2015. 
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out new markets or suppliers. The threat of future sanctions may also result in a 
higher perception of risk to those firms economically active in Russia. This may result 
in a deterioration of the business environment that may deter investment.  
 
Impact on trade  
 
Russia’s trade with the world fell substantially in 2014. In 2014, exports amounted to 
$497.8 billion, down from $523.3 billion in the previous year (a drop of nearly 5%). 
Imports fell from $341.3 billion in 2013 to $308 billion in 2014 (a fall of 10%). 
Again, this decline in trade was largely driven by changes in the price of oil and the 
exchange rate.25  
 
The composition of Russia’s foreign trade also shifted. 26  The share of China in 
Russian exports rose from 6.7% in 2013 to 7.5% in 2014. However, total trade with 
the EU also rose. This included a decline in the EU’s share of total Russian imports 
(from 42.5% in 2013 to 41.4% in 2014). The food embargo undoubtedly contributed 
to this decline. Perhaps unexpectedly, given both sanctions and the decline in the 
price of oil, the EU’s share of total Russian exports rose from 45.7% to 52.2% in 
2014. Thus, at this early stage, there was no evidence of a significant shift in trade 
from the EU to China. This demonstrates that caution should be applied when 
interpreting Russian official statements signalling a desire to ‘pivot’ away from 
economic integration with Western countries to non-Western countries. Any 
meaningful shift in the direction of Russia’s external economic relations is likely to 
take decades. 
 
Impact on investment 
25 ‘International Trade in Goods – Exports 2001-2014’, International Trade Centre, available at: 
http://www.intracen.org/itc/market-info-tools/statistics-export-product-country/, accessed 20 August 
2015. 
26 ‘International Trade in Goods – Exports 2001-2014’, International Trade Centre, available at: 
http://www.intracen.org/itc/market-info-tools/statistics-export-product-country/, accessed 20 August 
2015. 
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 At around 20% of GDP, investment in fixed capital in Russia is, by the standards of 
many other middle-income countries, comparatively low. It is certainly too low to 
generate economic diversification and modernisation (Connolly 2011; Gaddy and 
Ickes 2014). There has been a clear trend towards declining investment growth since 
2010, with a sharp contraction in investment observed in the final quarter of 2014 
(Figure 8). This was likely to have been caused by the drop in the oil price and the 
concomitant depreciation of the ruble.  
 
<Insert Figure 8> 
 
Around 30% of total fixed capital formation in Russia takes place in extractive 
industries (i.e. the extraction of metals and hydrocarbons). 27  Consequently, when 
sentiment in that sector takes a turn for the worse – as it did in 2008-9 and again in the 
final quarter of 2014 – aggregate investment also falls. Moreover, many of the capital 
goods and equipment used in investment activities are imported (Berezinskaya and 
Vedev 2015). This means that exchange rate depreciation of the sort observed in the 
second half of 2014 raises the cost of investment, leading to many firms postponing or 
cancelling planned investment.       
 
There is also some evidence that the composition of investment shifted slightly. 
According to official statistics, the fastest growth in fixed investment data took place 
in the sectors associated with military production (aircraft, transport equipment, and 
other machinery) and food production. The sharpest decline in investment activity 
took place in extractive industries. This is to be expected given the downturn in 
energy prices. Because military spending and its associated investment was already 
scheduled before the imposition of sanctions, and because of the decline in energy 
prices, it is unlikely that sanctions contributed much to the overall trends described 
here.   
27  ‘Natsional'nye scheta’ [National Accounts], Federal State Statistics Service, available at: 
http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/accounts/#, accessed 20 August 
2015.  
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 <Insert Figure 9> 
 
Finally, as illustrated in Figure 9, foreign direct investment in Russia became a net 
outflow in the second half of 2014.28 While this is not unprecedented (see 2005, for 
example), the fact that it accompanied a wider contraction in investment indicates that 
at the time of writing the prospects for investment in Russia appear bleak. It is likely 
that this was due to structural deficiencies in the Russian economy, as well as to the 
decline in oil prices, rather than as a direct result of sanctions. Nevertheless, sanctions 
added yet another reason for investors – Russian or foreign – to put off investment.     
 
Summary of the economic impact of Western statecraft 
 
As outlined above, the precise impact of sanctions is difficult to discern, and was 
complicated by the influence of Russia’s own structural economic slowdown and the 
sharp decline in oil prices that began in the summer of 2014. The direct impact on 
targeted sectors has been mixed. In terms of output, the defence and energy industries 
performed relatively well in 2014. This appeared unlikely to change in the short-term. 
Similarly, the Russian food embargo did not result in a change in fortunes – in either 
direction -- for domestic producers. The sanctions that targeted the financial sector 
appeared to cause the most immediate disruption. The sizeable external debt 
repayments in 2014 made an important contribution to capital outflows, which in turn 
contributed to the depreciation of the ruble. However, Russia’s overall financial 
position remained comparatively strong, and it is unlikely that sanctions will be 
sufficient to induce a financial crisis in Russia, at least in the short-term.  
 
In all instances where sanctions have been imposed, the Russian state has initiated a 
range of counter-measures, including a wide-ranging import substitution plan, as well 
as the provision of financial support to targeted firms and sectors. These counter 
measures may succeed in insulating Russia from the threat of future sanctions due to 
the weakening of Russia’s economic ties with those countries that imposed the current 
sanctions. As a result, if these measures are sustained – and the government made it 
28 On recent patterns of FDI in Russia, see Iwasaki and Suganuma 2007; Brock 2005.  
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clear that they will be – Russia may be much less susceptible to similar external 
pressure in the future.  
 
The Impact on Russian Political Economy 
 
As well as affecting the performance of the Russian economy, Western economic 
statecraft has also generated a series of policy responses from the Russia government. 
As well as the imposition of counter sanctions in the agricultural sector, the Russian 
government has developed, and continued to further refine, a set of economic policies 
that emphasised self-sufficiency and a reassessment of Russia’s pattern of integration 
with the global economy. Russia’s response should not be a surprise. Past evidence 
from the use of economic statecraft – the economic instruments, such as travel bans, 
asset freezes, trade embargoes, and sanctions employed by Western powers (and their 
allies) and Russia as instruments of foreign policy -- reveals that those countries that 
are the ‘target’ of sanctions tend to respond in a relatively predictable manner.29 This 
analysis highlights how Russia’s response to sanctions confirms three hypotheses 
derived from the extant literature on sanctions.  
 
1. The impact of sanctions varies according to regime type of the target country  
 
Sanctions affect leaders and populations in different political systems in different 
ways. As Risa Brooks argues, ‘sanctions that harm the macro economy and thus hurt 
the “median voter” [are more likely to] be effective against democratic states’, while 
authoritarian leaders, by contrast, ‘tend to be insulated from aggregate or macro-
economic pressures’ and therefore cannot be expected to be as responsive to popular 
opinion as democracies (Brooks 2002). Indeed, as Susan Allen suggests, the 
‘domestic political response to sanctions varies greatly by the regime type of the 
target. As states become more politically open, the domestic public can—and does, to 
some degree—create political costs for leaders who resist sanctions’ (Allen 2008).  By 
contrast, in non-democracies, like Russia, leaders may in fact profit from sanctions. 
Without being accountable to the wider public, elites can do this relatively unchecked, 
as ‘leaders may actually benefit from sanctions, as domestic publics are unable to 
29 See, for example, Allen (2008), Brooks (2002), Major (2012), Peksen and Cooper-Drury (2010), 
Portela (2010 & 2014) and von Soest and Wahman (2015). 
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impose political costs and the economic constraints of sanctions often allow leaders to 
extract greater rents while overseeing the trade of scarce goods’ (Allen 2008). 
 
Russia’s system of political economy is based on the redistribution of rent flows from 
its internationally competitive natural resource industries (Connolly 2013; Connolly 
2015a; Gaddy and Ickes 2005, Gaddy and Ickes 2010). Revenues generated by oil, 
gas, and metals exports are used to support high levels of social welfare spending, as 
well as Russia’s recent rearmament programme. A system such as this, based on the 
redistribution of rent flows, means that the Russian state was well-equipped to 
insulate the elite to cushion it from impact of sanctions. As a result, even if economic 
statecraft imposes costs on the bulk of a country’s citizenry, what is most important 
from the perspective of the incumbent leadership is whether it can maintain the 
support of the elite. Over the course of 2014-2015, the Russian leadership was 
relatively successful in channelling resources to politically well-connected allies. 
Sanctioned individuals – such as Gennadii Timchenko and Arkadii Rotenberg – 
received access to lucrative construction contracts, while systemically important 
firms, such as the state-owned oil giant, Rosneft’, successfully lobbied for access to 
financial resources from the sovereign wealth fund.   
 
In addition to the state support provided to key members of the elite, it is also 
instructive that the composition of the federal budget over the course of 2014-2015 
also shifted to protect those constituencies that might be considered as integral to the 
prevailing system of political economy in Russia, including industries like defence, 
rail machinery, oil and gas machinery and pipelines manufacturing, as well as people 
dependent on government spending (the so-called byudzhetniki, such as pensioners or 
those employed in the vast state bureaucracy; see Connolly 2015a). Thus, even 
though the nominal ruble value of the revised federal budget for 2015 shrank by 
5.7%, the budget chapter covering politically-important social policy spending rose 
by 5.1% (Ministry of Finance, 2015). Although it is true that the chapters reserved for 
national defence and national security and the legal system declined (by 4.8% and 
3.7% respectively), this was a much less severe than the cuts applied to housing and 
municipal services (-10.8%), environmental protection (-16.1%), the national 
economy (-8.8%), and health (-8.3%). Therefore, despite challenging macroeconomic 
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conditions, the Russian government was able to insulate its key constituencies from 
economic hardship.    
 
2. Sanctions can result in redistribution in target countries that strengthens the 
existing system 
 
Not only can non-democratic regimes allocate scarce resources to allies of the 
incumbent regime in order to strengthen elite cohesion, they are also able to 
redistribute resources to important socio-economic constituencies that will ensure 
popular, as well as elite, support for the regime. Indeed, as Johan Galtung observes, 
sanctions can be create the conditions for the rise of powerful constituencies in the 
target nation that benefit from international isolation (Galtung 1967). This is because, 
in the long run, sanctions often foster the development of domestic industries in the 
target country, thus reducing the target’s dependence on the outside world and the 
ability of sender countries to influence the target’s behaviour through economic 
coercion. 
 
The economic policy climate in Russia since the imposition of sanctions emphasised 
support for precisely those industries that are targeted by sanctions. Import 
substitution (importozameshchenie) – popular among only a minority before 2014 – 
became increasingly fashionable among policy-makers, experts and many businesses 
in Russia. The longer Russia is isolated from the global economy, as will happen the 
longer sanctions persist, the more likely it is that these forces will grow to dominate 
economic policy-making. Indeed, the interruption of supply chains prompted a 
reallocation of resources to domestic industries through import substitution 
programmes, such as that designed to help build defence-industrial products 
previously imported from Ukrainian enterprises. In April 2015, Denis Manturov, the 
Minister for Industry and Trade, presented a plan for import substitution that 
envisaged the implementation of 2,059 projects across 19 branches of the economy 
between 2016-2020 (Yedovina and Shapovalov 2015).30 The total cost was estimated 
to reach over RUB 1.5 trillion, with RUB 235 billion to be supplied by the federal 
budget. Over the course of 2014-2015, extra resources were allocated to the oil and 
30 Of this total, 570 projects were said to be under way by November 2015.  
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gas equipment industry, the pharmaceutical industry, the agricultural machinery and 
production industries, and, of course, the military-industrial complex. All of these are 
key economic constituencies that account for a large share of employment in Russia, 
and all are benefitting from friendly public policies taken as a direct result of the 
imposition of sanctions.  
 
3. Sanctions can cause a ‘rally round the flag’ effect  
 
Finally, previous episodes of sanctions reveal that sanctions can also generate a ‘rally 
round the flag’ effect in target countries, in which sanctions lead to an increase in 
political cohesion within the target state. The imposition of sanctions enables targeted 
leaders to pinpoint a clear external threat, which can be used as a focal point for a 
leader to unify the state (Coser 1956; Downs and Rocke 1994; Smith 1996). Leaders 
can also place the blame for economic hardship on the sender state rather than on their 
own economic policies, suggesting that sanctioned populations might rally against the 
enemy or sender state (Mueller 1970; Mueller 1973; Ostrom and Job 1986; Galtung 
1967). 
 
In Russia, there is considerable evidence that such a ‘rally round the flag’ effect 
occurred over the course of 2014-2015. Not only did all opinion polls show public 
support for the leadership to be near record high levels, with public support especially 
high for the President, but the Western sanctions regime also gave the leadership a 
convenient alibi for the structural downturn in the economy described earlier in this 
article. Without sanctions, it is possible that the leadership would have come under 
much greater public scrutiny for its poor stewardship of the economy. However, the 
leadership was able to assign blame for any economic hardship to external enemies. 
On a broader level, there was also evidence that ‘standing up to the West’ gave many 
(although not all) Russian citizens a greater sense of pride in their country’s standing 
on the international stage. Public approval ratings for President Putin, as measured by 
the respected Levada Centre, rose from 65% in January 2014 to 83% after the 
annexation of Crimea, and were as high as 89% in June 2015. 31 These were the 
31 The Levada Centre Indexes, available at: http://www.levada.ru/indeksy, accessed 20 August 2015. 
The impact of the conflict with the West on Putin’s popularity is discussed in Simes 2015.  
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highest approval ratings ever enjoyed by Putin. Time may erode this sense of pride 
felt by many, but in the short-term at least, it was clear that most Russians had indeed 
‘rallied round the flag’.   
 
Towards the securitisation of political economy in Russia? 
 
The impact of Western economic statecraft was most observable at the domestic 
political level. Because statecraft tends to affect non-democracies in a different way to 
democracies, it was perhaps unsurprising that the Russian leadership was able to 
reallocate resources to its allies within the elite, and also to key economic 
constituencies across Russia. Under the mantra of import substitution, economic 
policy began to take an increasingly introverted and dirigiste turn. Nevertheless, this 
blend of economic nationalism proved, at least at the time of writing, to be very 
popular among large swathes of the Russian population.  
 
Taken together, the response to economic statecraft described above can be seen as 
evidence that Russia’s economic policy debate was becoming increasingly 
characterised by an emphasis on self-reliance that was justified in the name of 
security, with economic policy subsumed within a wider effort to insulate Russia from 
a growing array of internal and external threats. This tendency can be labeled 
‘securitisation’ and was affecting an increasingly wide range of areas of economic 
activity.32 As of late 2015, official plans for economic securitisation in the form of 
public statements and government documents and decrees were inchoate and lacking 
in cohesion. There was no clearly formulated agreement on desired objectives or on 
the precise means that might be deployed to achieve those objectives. Also, a 
powerful array of constituencies remains opposed to rolling back many of the market 
reforms undertaken since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Yet the growing sense of 
insecurity felt by those in the Kremlin appeared to be leading to an increase in the 
relative power of those groups in and around the state apparatus that would like to see 
32 See Bacon, Renz and Cooper (2006), who adapted Ole Waever’s concept of securitisation to 
Russia’s domestic politics; securitisation is what happens ‘when normal politics is pushed into the 
security realm’, and that the ‘securitisation of an issue in a policy sector occurs when a political actor 
by the use of the rhetoric of existential threat…succeeds in justifying the adoption of measures outside 
the formal norms and procedures of politics’.  
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Russia adopt a new agenda for economic development. If, as this article suggests, 
economic policy was increasingly defined by security concerns – if the process of 
economic securitisation was already under way – then the ramifications of this policy 
change may be profound.   
 
Economic securitisation has the potential to change important aspects of Russia’s 
political economy. These include, but are not limited to: the primary objectives of 
national economic activity as defined by the state (security v. economic freedom 
and/or consumer welfare); the means used to meet state objectives (the use and nature 
of strategic planning); the means of resource allocation (state v. market; large 
enterprises v. small enterprises); the priority accorded to different types of economic 
activity (consumption v. investment; agriculture v. other consumer industries); the 
depth of Russia’s integration with the global economy (the degree to which Russia 
interacts with the global economy); and the scope of Russia’s external economic ties 
(with whom and in which areas Russia interacts) 
 
Thus, given the ambiguity surrounding the efficacy of sanctions outlined in the 
previous section, it is reasonable to question whether Western sanctions exerted the 
effect that sender countries intended. Instead of causing elite dissatisfaction, elite 
cohesion appeared to have strengthened. And instead of imposing significant 
economic pain, sanctions merely gave the leadership a convenient alibi for what was 
already a poorly performing economy. Their senders surely did not intend these 
effects, which raises the question of whether more effective instruments could have 




The economic statecraft deployed by Western countries and their allies against Russia 
in response to its involvement in the conflict in Ukraine since March 2014 has the 
potential to shape profoundly the nature of Russia’s future economic development. 
While economic statecraft was employed extensively throughout the Cold War, with 
only a modest impact on Soviet economic organisation and performance, the recent 
33 More effective instruments could have included, for example, a greater emphasis on military 
responses to Russian assertiveness, or on intensified efforts to target Russian elite assets in the West. 
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episode has been played out in a radically different context. Over the past two 
decades, the Russian economy has undergone historically unprecedented liberalisation 
at home, even if the quality and scope of that liberalisation remains weak relative to 
Russia’s Western neighbours. Russia has also followed a path of deep, if somewhat 
distorted, integration with the global economy. As a result, the potential for at least 
the partial reversal of both domestic liberalisation and external integration is much 
greater than it was during the Soviet period when the degree of central economic 
control was much greater.   
 
While the assessment offered here is only preliminary, there are signs that the 
configuration of Russia’s system of political economy is changing. While the impact 
of economic statecraft on economic performance was, at the time of writing, difficult 
to discern, the impact on political economy appeared more pronounced. The 
economic policy debate in Russia was increasingly characterised by an emphasis on 
self-reliance in the name of security, with economic policy subsumed within a wider 
concern to insulate Russia from a growing array of external threats. 34 While the 
nature of the West’s relationship with Ukraine is the most obvious security threat 
cited by Russian officials, these officials have been clear in stating that there are many 
other, potentially even more serious, threats to Russian national interests. It is in this 
context that Russia’s reaction to Western economic statecraft can be more clearly 
understood: in a world that -- from the vantage point of the Kremlin -- appears 
increasingly menacing, many officials see economic security as an important 
component of Russia’s wider security. The centralised management of Russia’s 
external relations are, for many, a logical response to geopolitical uncertainty.          
 
It is worth noting at this point that the geopolitical conflict with Western powers over 
Ukraine, in which economic statecraft has been the weapon of choice, did not cause 
34 See for example: Security Council of the Russian Federation 2009; and more recently, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2013. For a discussion of the evolution of the perception of threats to Russian national 




                                                        
the shift towards the securitisation of economic policy in Russia. For the past decade, 
the Kremlin’s revealed preference for hands-on control across large swathes of the 
economy was clear. However, events subsequent to Russia’s annexation of Crimea 
accelerated the process of securitisation and weakened those in the technocratic policy 
elite who traditionally guarded the progress made by Russia, in terms of both 
economic liberalisation at home, and its current pattern of close integration with the 
Western part of the global economy.  
 
This should not be taken to mean that Russia is on the verge of resurrecting the 
centrally planned economy from the Soviet era. The demands of the 21st century 
economy would make such an endeavour self-defeating. Moreover, the nature of the 
global economy has changed dramatically since the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
During the Cold War there were no economically significant ‘third’ powers. This is 
no longer the case. In addition to the obvious example of China, there are a number of 
other rapidly growing low- and middle-income countries with which Russia could, in 
principle, develop closer economic ties. Nevertheless, it is plausible that a new type of 
system of political economy may be emerging in Russia, and one that satisfies the 
Kremlin’s urge to deal with what it perceives to be an increasingly threatening 
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